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A Woman’s Optics:  
 
Margaret Cavendish, Sensory Mimesis, and Early Modern Rhetorics of Science 
 
 
It is the great prerogative of Mankind above other Creatures, that we are 
not only able to behold the works of Nature . . . but we have also the power 
of considering, comparing, altering, assisting, and improving them to 
various uses. And as this is the peculiar privilege of humane Nature in 
general, so is it capable of being so far advanced by the helps of Art, and 
Experience, as to make some Men excel others in their Observations, and 
Deductions, almost as much as they do Beasts. 
 
Robert Hooke, 1665, Micrographia, p. 1 
 
But the all-powerful God, and his servant nature, know that art [artificial 
means], which is but a particular creature, cannot inform us of the truth of 
the infinite parts of nature, being but finite itself.  
 
Margaret Cavendish, 1666b, Observations, p. 48 
 
On May 30, 1667, the experimental methods of the Royal Society of London were 
placed on display during a historic meeting. Robert Boyle, then Curator of Experiments, 
set up a microscope and prepared to present a miniscule view of various natural elements 
for that day’s meeting attendees. The experiments were meant to showcase what he and 
fellow member of the Royal Society, Robert Hooke, considered as “the great prerogative 
of Mankind,” that of beholding nature in its constitutive parts. Royal Society members, of 
course, were no strangers to a microscopic view of matter, due to the rising popularity of 
the device following the success of Robert Hooke’s Micrographia (1665), the 
organization’s first major publication by one of its members. Nevertheless, the energy of 
the room was more frenzied than usual that day, and Boyle had to halt his presentation, 
as it was meant for the eyes of one particular observer who had yet to arrive. Rarely did 
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the Royal Society extend invitations to non-members, but this visitor had composed an 
emphatic critique of experimental natural philosophy, specifically the optics theorized in 
Boyle and Hooke’s work. So everyone waited, hoping to proffer the undeniable benefits of 
the microscope to their critic, Margaret Cavendish. Cavendish, however, would arrive 
over an hour late, her words would be few, and it would be her last meeting at the Royal 
Society. 
When Cavendish accepted this invitation, she became the first woman to attend a 
meeting at the Royal Society. Considering that women would not receive election to join 
the organization until 1945 (Royal Society n.d.), Cavendish’s presence at this meeting 
marks an important moment in histories and rhetorics of science. As Cavendish openly 
and harshly critiqued the Royal Society’s epistemic practices in Observations (1666), she 
did so at a time when most women’s opinions were all too easy to dismiss. Her marriage 
to William Cavendish, however, afforded opportunities not usually extended to women in 
early modern England: she became “Duchess of Newcastle,” gained entry into an elite 
group of thinkers surrounding her husband known as the “Cavendish Circle, which would 
regularly include the likes of Rene Descartes and Thomas Hobbes (Cunning 2017, para. 3), 
and acquired the ability to publish and print her philosophical, scientific, and literary 
work.1 Of course, that central place in the public eye led to Cavendish’s reputation as little 
more than a spectacle to her contemporaries (Lilley 1992, ix). 
 
1 Tina Skouen and Ryan J. Stark report that Cavendish was “the first and the only 
Englishwoman of the period to publish works in natural philosophy in her own name” 
(Skouen and Stark, 2015, 13). A recent collection by Leah Knight, Micheline White, and 
Elizabeth Sauer (2018), Women’s Bookscapes in Early Modern Britain, sheds light on the 
writing, publishing, and reading practices of early modern women, and Julie Crawford 
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Because of her social status and prolific authorship, members of the Society, such 
as Samuel Pepys, continually sought and failed to make Cavendish’s acquaintance. Once 
when she rode into the city, Pepys and a large crowd of others gathered to view her 
arrival, but, Pepys described, “we could not, she being fallowed and crowded upon by 
coaches all the way she went, that nobody could come near her” (1667, 196). Recognizing 
her influence and knowing her “desire to be present at one of the meetings of the 
Society,” another Society member and member of Parliament, Lord George Berkeley, 
made a request on May 23, 1667 to extend a meeting invitation to Cavendish (Birch 1756, 
176). Much debate ensued, as some feared that the event would make a mockery of the 
Society (Mintz 1952, 171-72). Mockery or not, from the moment Berkeley’s request was 
granted, everyone knew that the event would spark controversy throughout London.  
When Cavendish did finally arrive on May 30, 1667, it was “with glorious train and 
gilded coach, and horse with many a tassle” (Whitaker 2003, 299). She was met at the 
door by the President of the Society, Lord Brouncker, and seated next to him for the 
entirety of the meeting. Pepys and the other members watched Cavendish with intent 
and eagerly awaited her response to Boyle’s experiments. Her reaction, they anticipated, 
would be as fiery as her written critiques. Instead, as Pepys chronicles, “I [did not] hear 
her say any thing that was worth hearing, but that she was full of admiration, all 
admiration. . . . After they had shown her many experiments, and she cried still she was 
 
uncovers how Cavendish was especially strategic in the distributing of her texts, ensuring 
that certain university libraries maintained copies of her folios (Crawford, 2018, 114). This 
care taken to consider the longevity of her work shows that Cavendish viewed her ideas as 
compendiums to other established texts in the universities like Hooke’s. 
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full of admiration, she departed” (Pepys 1667, 243). Scholarly depictions of her 
performance that day present Cavendish as “plagued by shyness” (Whitaker 2003, 290) 
and “afflicted with her usual bashfulness” (Sutherland 1997, 269). This depiction of 
Cavendish’s visit to the Royal Society as a let down has clouded how historians of rhetoric 
interpret her scientific writing. 
Cavendish is often considered a “practitioner of rhetoric,” one who aspired to the 
rhetorical tradition but who “never developed a coherent theory of it” (Sutherland 1997, 
255; Kennedy, 1999, 263). Rather, the rhetorical tradition running through early modern 
England, George A. Kennedy explains, centered instead on Hobbes, Locke, and the “new 
logic” of the Royal Society. Because this new Baconian logic was channeled through the 
“plain” scientific prose of experimental philosophy, Cavendish’s stylistic flourishes and 
“flights of fancy” were widely dismissed in her time (Stark 1999; Nate 2001). Hui Wu 
further explains that the problem with studying Cavendish in contemporary rhetorical 
scholarship is that her work does not quite “meet the criteria of [the] rhetorical tradition 
and academic feminism” (2005, 171). I argue that finding Cavendish’s most substantial 
contribution in the history of rhetoric may not come from examining the traditional 
rhetorical artifacts that these scholars have queried, namely her novellas, poetry, and 
general treatises. Instead, Cavendish’s contributions to rhetoric come to fore through her 
scientific writing, through her critique of Hooke’s Micrographia, her reimagining of early 
modern metaphysics, and her theorization of an alternative optics to counter that of the 
Royal Society’s. 
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Teasing out the details of this alternative optics requires, admittedly, a bit of 
critical imagination. In Feminist Rhetorical Practices, Jacqueline Jones Royster and Gesa E. 
Kirsch define critical imagination as a methodology employed to speculate on existing 
evidence (2012, 71). The first step in employing critical imagination, they explain, is 
“gathering whatever evidence can be gathered and ordering it in a configuration that is 
reasonable and justifiable in accord with basic scholarly methodologies” (Royster and 
Kirsch 2012, 71). The second step is then thinking “between, above, around, and beyond 
this evidence to speculate methodically about probabilities” (Royster and Kirsch 2012, 71). 
In the case of Cavendish, established evidence has centered almost exclusively on The 
World’s Olio, Orations of Divers Sorts, and The Blazing World. However, gathering new 
evidence through her theories of experimental philosophy explicated in Observations on 
Experimental Philosophy reveals two unconsidered elements of her work to scholars in the 
history of rhetoric and rhetorics of science. First, Cavendish’s famous debate with Hooke 
and the Royal Society was primarily a contention centered on optics and new ways of 
seeing emerging around the microscope. Second, the rhetorical and poetic concept of 
mimesis offered Cavendish the epistemological confidence needed to critique the optics 
of the Royal Society. Whereas the optics of the Royal Society created distance and 
difference between the observer and the object of study, Cavendish’s optics would 
connect the observer with the natural world through a theory of mimetic patterning.  
Cavendish’s critiques of Renaissance epistemologies through her own alternative 
science thus offers a new angle from which to consider what Jeanne Fahnestock has 
argued in Rhetorical Figures in Science, namely that rhetorical concepts have structured 
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scientific thinking, particularly in scientific paradigm shifts. Here, I argue that mimesis 
helped Cavendish to anticipate a scientific epistemology more accessible to early modern 
women in how the term allowed her to envision an expansion of agency in scientific study 
that extended beyond the traditional scientific observer. To uncover the rhetorical 
underpinnings of Cavendish’s optics, I first track Cavendish’s points of contention with 
Hooke’s Micrographia, presenting her critique as itself a rhetoric of science, however one 
concerned less with Hooke’s argumentation style as with his pedagogy of sight. Next, I 
explicate Cavendish’s unique theory of optics based around her concept of “patterning,” 
which I argue is an extension of rhetorical mimesis or “imitation.” Finally, I consider how 
the rhetorical concept of mimesis allowed Cavendish to cast a skeptical glance at science 
and imagine alternate ways of knowing that anticipated feminist science studies. Thus, 
reviving Cavendish’s science offers an extended analysis of the rhetorical valences of one 
woman’s embodied, material optics.  
Artless Microscopy and the Bodily Work of Observation 
With their motto “Nullius in verba,” which was translated as “take nobody’s word 
for it” (Royal Society n.d., para. 3), notable members of the Royal Society soon became the 
definitive authority among experimental philosophers after the establishment of the 
learned collective in 1660. Its mission brought members like Boyle and Hooke to verify all 
statements concerning the natural world through what Jordynn Jack calls “new empirical 
evidence” to support their theories (Jack 2009, 194). In the case of the microscope, this 
new empirical evidence derived from the ability to see the minutiae of matter. Hooke’s 
first collection of microscopic images—Micrographia—showcased fleas, charcoal, and 
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other natural entities through refractive lenses, as seen in 
Figures 1 and 2, and presented the idea that technological 
instruments like the microscope extended the human 
senses, rendering visible elements of matter that were 
previously imperceptible. Accompanying Hooke’s images, 
Jack explains, was a “pedagogy of sight” that instructed 
viewers how to interpret images through the Royal Society’s 
epistemic framework. The microscope, and the ways of 
seeing emerging alongside it, required that scientists 
related to their objects mechanistically. Only premises that 
could be mechanistically observed were considered as the 
kind of “proof” necessary to validate one’s hypothesis.  
 Only aristocratic, educated males, 
however, or those who comprised the 
membership of the Royal Society, were extended 
the opportunity to use these scientific tools for 
intellectual ends—an exclusivity that often 
prevented women and people of lower classes 
from wielding argumentative authority. In effect, 
historian Eve Keller argues, the microscope was 
therefore less about discovering the “truth” of nature and more about producing men as 
“petty gods” (1997, 467). In turn, Cavendish’s antagonism with the Royal Society had less 
Figure 1. The Eyes of a Grey 
Drone-Fly. 
(Hooke 1665, 252) 
 
Figure 2. Observation of a Flea. 
(Hooke 1665, 307) 
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to do with what could be seen by the microscope and more to do with the “pride of place 
that she saw some experimentalists giving to empirical observation” (Marshall 2016, xii). 
This pride of place, too, brings Alan Gross to describe Micrographia as deliberative 
rhetoric, in part didactic science, but largely an exhortation for readers to support the 
ideals of the Royal Society (2016, 17-18). That is, Micrographia was less a scientific manual 
than a persuasive text designed to show the Royal Society and its natural philosophers as 
trusted and respected discoverers of “God’s handiwork” (Gross, 2016, 19).  
By zeroing in on the Society’s first major publication, Cavendish signaled that her 
message not only targeted Hooke’s “artificial means” via the microscope, but also the 
epistemological foundations of this emerging science. Cavendish thus entered into larger 
Renaissance conversations regarding the relationship between “art” and nature as well as 
the origins of knowledge itself. Historian of early modern philosophy Sarah Hutton 
depicts this particular historical moment as “a time of enormous intellectual ferment,” a 
time when predominant Aristotelian paradigms of knowledge were being challenged by 
the emergent philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes, and others (2003, 186-187). These new 
philosophies questioned whether and how human knowledge could be certain of that 
which it ascertained. At least for Cavendish, the main foci of these debates—the 
relationship between art and nature, the status of knowledge, and the role of sensation in 
knowledge—converged in the technology of the microscope. The microscope became a 
nexus on which Cavendish could base an alternative scientific epistemology and theory of 
optics. 
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In Observations, Cavendish leveled a three-fold critique against Hooke’s optics in 
Micrographia: 1) the degree of authority given to “art”; 2) the depiction of the human 
senses as in need of extension and correction through microscopy, a tenet that disavowed 
contemplative philosophy as a reputable method of scientific inquiry; 3) the claim that 
nature’s “internal substance” could be derived from microscopic images. As she engaged 
with Hooke, Cavendish argued that attentive sensing could lead to reputable scientific 
discoveries. If Hooke contended that theorists must use microscopy to contribute to 
scientific knowledge, then Cavendish would theorize an optics in which observation was 
not a specialization, and in which the apparatus used to discover scientific truths was 
natural to both men and women.  According to Cavendish’s scientific epistemology, the 
truest knowledge came primarily through the body’s biological way of sensing, through 
the lenses of the eye, rather than through mechanical instruments.2  
The Authority of “Art” 
In the opening of Observations, Cavendish quoted a portion of Hooke’s preface in 
Micrographia to center her critique and expose Hooke’s belief that human sensation was 
prone to error, able to lead the mind toward inaccurate reasoning. Here, I include that 
 
2 Cavendish’s engagement with Hooke was certainly a matter of “optics.” Although 
modern conceptions of optics relate to physics—reflection, refraction, and how light 
enters the eye—this shift in focus from sight to light is a relatively recent occurrence in 
the history of optics, explains historian A. Mark Smith. Smith traces the etymology of the 
Greek optika to opteu𝑜𝑜 (“to see”) and both words to 𝑜𝑜ps (“eye”) (2015, 25). Only with 
Kepler’s theorization of the retinal image, Smith argues, did the study of optics become 
more concerned with light than with sight. In early modern England, then, Cavendish 
would have conceived of her explication of Hooke’s way of seeing and her own theory of 
visual perception as a theory of optics. 
 10 
section of Hooke’s preface at length to show the repetitive insistence on the “mischiefs,” 
“imperfections,” and “errors” of the senses by which “art” is meant to make reparation:  
By the addition of such artificial Instruments and methods, there may be, in some 
manner, a reparation made for the mischiefs, and imperfection, mankind has 
drawn upon it self, by negligence, and intemperance, and a wilful and superstitious 
deserting the Prescripts and Rules of Nature, whereby every man, both from a 
deriv’d corruption, innate and born with him, and from his breeding and converse 
with men, is very subject to slip into all sorts of errors. (Hooke 1665, 1) 
 
Only the scientific expert—the one who has properly applied reason and artificial means 
to nature—Hooke’s epistemology entailed, might come to accurate scientific conclusions. 
Cavendish maintained, in her rebuttal to the passage, that reparations are not so easily 
made, precisely because all “art” was as finite as the conclusions of a sensing human 
observer. Cavendish would instead emphasize the finitude of “art,” as she put it: “But the 
all-powerful God, and his servant nature, know, that art, which is but a particular 
creature, cannot inform us of the truth of the infinite parts of nature, being but finite 
itself” (Cavendish 1666b, 5). The artificial, according to Cavendish, could never supersede 
the natural.  
 If one central question guided Cavendish’s thought in Observations it was to what 
extent art could alter nature, suggests historian of philosophy Susan James (James, 2018, 
31). According to Aristotelian metaphysics, art could imitate nature, but not equal or 
surpass it (James, 2018, 31). Hooke’s microscopy contended instead that art could indeed 
transform nature, insisting that by artificial means, “the Heavens are open’d, . . . and new 
Productions appear in them, to which the ancient Astronomers were utterly Strangers” 
(Hooke, 1665, 4). According to Cavendish, however, microscopes offered a view of life in 
cross section, a partial perspective that “doth more easily alter than inform” (Cavendish 
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1666b, 50). Such microscopic slices on which Hooke and others based their reasoning was 
not “pure nature,” but what Cavendish called “hermaphroditical mixtures,” termed as 
such because the results of microscopy were, as she put it, “partly natural, and partly 
artificial” (Cavendish 1666b, 197). Of course, definitions of where nature ended and art 
began were quite blurry for Renaissance thinkers, and for Cavendish, the more 
fundamental question was whether such lines should be drawn in the first place.  
 As with other foundational ideas in the “new logic” of the Royal Society, a 
touchstone in art/nature distinctions can be found in the work of Francis Bacon. As 
historian Sophie Weeks details, Bacon authored careful redefinitions of “nature” and “art” 
as he challenged the traditional Aristotelian narrative of art as imitative of nature (Weeks, 
2007, 106). As Weeks purports, nature, according to Bacon, had endless possibilities, of 
which only one possibility might be actualized at a time. Art brought to fore those 
alternative possibilities, evoking that which lay nascent. The ultimate goal of Bacon’s new 
science, then, was to “obliterate nature’s habitual courses” through “the systematic 
unveiling of [its] hidden facets” (Weeks, 2007, 128). The problem for Cavendish was not 
that art could reveal nature but that art came to be seen as the best, if not the only, 
method for revealing nature. Nature, in other words, was stripped of the power to reveal 
itself, to speak in its own right. And if nature could not speak directly to human intuition, 
then, among other implications, women had no means by which to listen. 
In looking at how Hooke theorized from the slices of life offered by mechanical 
means, Cavendish perceived how a hierarchy might emerge in the relationship between 
scientists and their objects of study. In championing how the microscope extended the 
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senses and granted dominion over nature, Royal Society members like Hooke were, at 
least in Cavendish’s estimation, forgetting their own status as finite parts of the same 
nature” they sought to understand, suggests historian and philosopher of science Ian 
Lawson (2015, 595). Anaesthetizing what was placed beneath the microscope, dissecting 
life and bringing it to stillness, allowed the scientist to emerge as seemingly the only 
active agent in scientific encounters. To be clear, Cavendish’s difficulty was not so much 
with only seeing a slice of the object as with how the object was primarily studied in its 
static, specimen-form as well as how such a slice seemed to ignore the synoptic 
environment from which the object was extracted.3 For Cavendish, truth of the natural 
world could only be ascertained if objects were studied in their living form, moving 
throughout its environment and interacting with the other agents therein. 
 Hobbes, the thinker who perhaps had the most influence on Cavendish’s own 
natural philosophy and who pushed against the metaphysics of the Royal Society as 
staunchly as Cavendish, would also make the relationship between art and nature central 
to his philosophy.4 This relationship was perhaps best captured in Hobbes’s analogy of 
 
3 Hooke’s theory of vision, it should also be noted, was not altogether different 
from Cavendish’s. Christa Knellwolf explains that for Hooke, vision was “a mechanical 
process of registering corpuscular light which, in the mind, produces Ideas which he 
‘suppose[s] to be material and bulky’” (Knellwolf 2001, 195). Ian Lawson further argues 
that “Hooke’s aim was never to . . . share with his readers . . . a realistic impression of 
sight with a microscope, but his privileged knowledge of the microworld” (Lawson 2016, 
39). The key difference in their respective optics is that Hooke had no conception of sense 
organs as patterning objects’ internal motion.  
 
4 Hobbes, it seems, was at least Cavendish’s earliest philosophical influence, according to 
Eileen O’Neill. Hobbes served as her husband’s tutor in his youth, and Hobbes remained 
close to the family thereafter as a main figure of the “Newcastle Circle” and as the 
Newcastle family served as his patrons (O’Neill, 1998; Detleftsen, 2007). Remnants of 
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the “artificial man,” which posited that the mechanical, mathematical laws that govern 
the universe may also govern human behavior (Ankers 2003, 246). Art as part of nature 
allowed humans to work within nature, to bring nature to its best possible end (Walton 
1987, 71). Case in point was how Hobbes considered rhetoric as one such art that might 
perfect humans’ natural tendencies. Arts like rhetoric, argues historian of rhetoric Ned 
O’Gorman, served as a means for transcending and thus overcoming what Hobbes 
considered as humans’ “hostile natural condition” (O’Gorman 2013, 5). As O’Gorman 
further explains, rhetoric, for Hobbes, “does not improve upon nature so much as recreate 
a natural pattern on an artificial plane so as to overcome what ‘evill men’ do naturally 
(O’Gorman 2013, 5). Artificial man, that individual able to overcome his nature, thus 
became a model of civil society, one in which nature, the individual, and society were 
unified (Ankers 2003, 246). Obeying authority, the idea went, was like obeying the laws of 
nature, and obeying the laws of nature was conforming to an inevitable, immutable logic 
(Ankers 2003, 247). Such emphasis on mechanism, however, brought Cavendish to 
consider artificial man as an analogy that sought to limit nature. Cavendish’s philosophy, 
then, would take Hobbes’s “artificial man” analogy and counter it to depict nature as an 
agential actor. As Neil Ankers shows: “Cavendish appropriates Hobbes’s ‘artificial man’ 
analogy and applies it to nature rather than to the nation state or ‘commonwealth’” 
 
Hobbes’s materialism is evident as a central undercurrent in Cavendish’s thought, yet she 
went to great lengths to distance herself from him, writing against his theories at times 
and denying that she knew him well at others. Once Cavendish even wrote that she had 
never read more than 20 words of Hobbes (Hutton, 1997). 
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(Ankers 2003, 247). That is, nature was given the non-mechanical agency and autonomy 
of human individuals (Ankers 2003, 247).  
The issue of agency in the relationship between art and nature was of utmost 
importance to Cavendish precisely because of her positionality as “Mad Madge,” or as a 
woman without formal education whose ideas were rarely taken seriously. The artificial 
powers for overcoming nature—such as rhetoric or the mechanical means of the 
microscope—were not as fully afforded to her. By Hobbes’s and Hooke’s systems, 
Cavendish could never achieve the status of “artificial man.” The competing 
epistemologies circulating in Renaissance thought, explains historian Eileen O’Neill, all 
entailed gendered mechanisms that discredited women’s ways of knowing and “all [had] 
in common the habit of ignoring and disparaging the experience and reality of women” 
(O’Neill, 1998, 95). Cavendish’s metaphysics, then, would have to be one in which the 
powers of rhetoric and the powers of observation, here inextricable, were afforded 
through nature itself—a metaphysics in which nature, and thus natural ways of knowing, 
were in need of no perfecting. 
The Knowledge of Sensation 
Of all the thinkers who contested the philosophical and scientific work of the 
Royal Society as it was emerging, Cavendish’s critique was the one that “constitutes the 
century’s most dramatic attempt to bend the discourse of [the Royal Society] to a radical 
cultural end,” according to literary studies scholar John Rogers (1996, 181).5 Cavendish’s 
 
5 Many elements of the Royal Society’s philosophical and scientific views were 
under contestation in Cavendish’s “attempt to bend [their] discourse.” Here particularly 
Rogers is speaking of the Society’s “monistic materialism,” or the idea that all matter is 
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particular style of scientific inquiry has been defined as “full-scale skepticism” (Sarasohn 
1984, 292), a “science of the fancy” meant to “restore the balance in an age of reason” 
(Bowerbank 1984, 406). Because, as Lisa T. Sarasohn puts it, “the path to conventional 
knowledge was closed to her” (1984, 292), Cavendish subverted established scientific 
epistemologies and practices, calling into question what science was and who could be 
considered a scientist. Whereas the experimental philosophers of the Royal Society 
sought methods for approaching nature through systematic and mechanical means, 
Cavendish practiced imaginative, speculative, and embodied ways of knowing, and her 
“justification for her lack of method [was] that she recreate[d] pure nature” (Bowerbank 
1984, 396). For Cavendish, arriving at the truth of nature could only come through direct 
sensory encounters with natural phenomena, discovering nature through biological 
apparatuses, not “artistic” means like the microscope.  
In a time in which the status of knowledge itself was subject to debate, Cavendish 
saw an opportunity to put forth imaginative, intuitive, and embodied ways of sensing and 
knowing as reputable methods of inquiry. “If no one can know anything absolutely,” 
Sarasohn articulates, “then there was no reason why [Cavendish’s] speculations might not 
be as correct or more correct than anyone else’s” (Sarasohn, 1984, 292-293). This instance 
on skepticism emerged at the time in which epistemology—that inquiry into what 
 
composed of a single element that was subordinated and organized by God (Rogers 1996, 
6). In contrast to monistic materialism, Cavendish adopted a “vitalist” view of matter. 
Vitalism contended that all matter was composed of self-moving, animate matter and 
that these many elements of matter might not always cohere into a unified whole 
(Marshall 2016, xvi). Other scholars define Cavendish’s view of matter as “panpsychist” 
(Broad 2011, 459). Still others define it as “vitalist materialism” (Boyle 2018, 62-63). 
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knowledge was, where it came from, and how humans could be certain of it—was 
becoming central in Renaissance thought. Yet epistemology was becoming central, 
historian Richard H. Popkin explains, precisely because skeptics like Cavendish 
continually leveled challenges against every new way of thinking (Popkin 1988, 684).6 
Established Aristotelian thought detailed that knowledge was first attained through 
sensory activity, then abstracted into objects via the intellect, and finally known 
conceptually. As we know, natural philosophers in the vein of the Royal Society broke 
with this theory and argued that individuals must develop “a special power for 
experiencing or apprehending the real nature of things” (Popkin 1988, 677), such special 
powers coming, of course, from experimental methods and artificial means. Still others 
called into question whether any human knowledge could be certain. Whereas Neo-
Platonists contended that full knowledge could never be acquired because that 
knowledge exceeded our human finitude, skeptics maintained that “perfect knowledge of 
a thing” might arrive “by immediate intuitive apprehension” (Popkin 1988, 673; 682). 
Erring on the side of this synoptic, intuitive knowledge, Cavendish would find the 
knowledge claims of natural philosophers too limited by their selections, or slices of life. 
 Cavendish’s contention with Hooke and the Royal Society’s experimental natural 
philosophy was that observation through microscopy, or artificial means, disallowed 
 
6 In many respects, Cavendish’s theories parallel the ideas expressed by Francisco 
Sanches, the skeptic and cousin of Michel de Montaigne, who argued that true scientific 
knowledge could never be acquired because all that humans could attain was “a limited 
knowledge of some things in the present” (Popkin, 1988, 682). The revised skepticism of 
Sanches and Montaigne, Popkin contends, became the challenge that must be met for 
those philosophers seeking a new foundation of knowledge (Popkin, 1988, 684). 
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individuals to sense the “whole” of natural phenomena. Hooke would maintain that 
without artificial means it was impossible to have complete understanding of nature: “Not 
having a full sensation of the Object, we must be very lame and imperfect in our 
conceptions of it, and in all the propositions which we built upon it” (Hooke 1665, 2, 
emphasis added). “Full sensation” was not something of which the human sensory 
apparatus was capable, Hooke would insist. And this fallibility of the senses would further 
impact the mechanism of memory and the mind: “Thus all uncertainty, and mistakes of 
humane actions, proceed either from the narrowness and wandring of our Senses, from 
the slipperiness or delusion of our Memory, [or] from the confinement or rashness of our 
Understanding” (Hooke 1665, 3). Properly wedding the senses to reason, or 
understanding, through “art” would bring experimental philosophers to more truthful 
methods of induction. In order to counter this epistemology, Cavendish would trouble 
this relationship to the senses and query whether and how knowledge could be acquired 
through sensation. For in Cavendish’s estimation, knowledge that came through natural 
processes like sensation must be credited if her mimetic epistemology or methods like 
contemplative philosophy could ever be legitimized. 
Her rebuttal was that extending the senses through “art” provided no such 
infallible reason or understanding. As she would reiterate, because “art” is “apt to delude 
sense,” it “cannot inform so well as reason doth” (Cavendish 1666b, 47). Cavendish further 
problematized Hooke’s sense/reason hypothesis by insisting that “sense, which is more 
apt to be deluded than reason, cannot be the ground of reason, no more than art 
[artificial means] can be the ground of nature. . . . For how can a fool order his 
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understanding by art, if nature has made [his understanding] defective?” (Cavendish 
1666b, 49). To put it another way, even though artificial means extended the senses, they 
were still subject to the fallibility of the senses. Unable to bring a scientist beyond sense, 
the microscope could not bring them beyond reason either. Consider, she asked of her 
readers, the widely varying results experimental philosophers accrued when they set out 
to observe the same objects at different times throughout the day. If truth were to be 
discoverable through the microscope, then it should not be altered given different 
conditions, as Cavendish lamented: “Artists do confess themselves, that flies, and the like, 
will appear of several figures or shapes, according to the several reflections, refractions, 
mediums and positions of several lights; which if so, how can they tell or judge which is 
the truest light, position, or medium, that doth present the object naturally as it is?” 
(Cavendish 1666b, 51). In so many words, Cavendish argued that with the variability of the 
natural world, replicability with these early microscopes would be nearly impossible. 
Thus experimental philosophers, in her estimation, should not declare that they have 
observed nature in its “true form” if they are unable to replicate their observations. “Art,” 
merely a tool for gathering different information from the natural world, could not 
provide holistic or more truthful information. Through their tools, experimental 
philosophers might better understand the molecular components of matter, but they 
were only able to say that matter was composed of minute building blocks, not how or 
why they contained them. For Cavendish, knowing more did not entail knowing better, 
and it certainly did not mean knowing all. 
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The intuitive, synoptic method of knowing favored by Cavendish was a 
contemplative philosophy—a way of knowing through reflection that Hooke frequently 
dismissed as unable to make valuable contributions to science. Hooke expressed his 
distaste for contemplative philosophy in Micrographia when he cautioned: “The truth is, 
the Science of Nature has been already too long made only a work of the Brain and the 
Fancy: It is now high time that it should return to the plainness and soundness of 
Observations on material and obvious things” (Hooke 1665, 5). He further remarked that 
any observer must “make use of the same method by the Senses,” via deduction through 
the microscope, if they were to contend with his experimental findings or “venture to 
compare the reality and the usefulness of his services, towards the true Philosophy, with 
those other men, that are of much stronger, and more acute speculations” (Hooke 1665, 
5). In other words, the apparatuses used to validate scientific hypotheses were no longer 
found in biological ways of sensing or in everyday ways of seeing. Instead, such validation 
was to be found only in mechanical apparatuses. To mark microscopy and other 
experimental tools as the only valid means by which to remark upon natural philosophy 
specialized the field and placed its authority beyond the reach for many in early modern 
England. 
With this new requirement for specialization, women, who already had little 
access to education, much less to optical tools, would find themselves even further 
removed from the realm of scientific knowledge. Cavendish reacted to this specialization 
by asking experimental philosophers to extend women the chance to stand on the same 
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epistemic ground. And she anticipated Hooke and other philosophers’ critiques as she 
entreated: 
Whether [women] would find out the philosophers’ stone, I doubt; for our sex is 
more apt to waste, than to make gold: However, I would have them try, especially 
those that have means to spend; for who knows but women might be more happy 
in finding it out, than man; and then would men have reason to employ their time 
in more profitable studies than in useless experiments. (Cavendish 1666b, 106) 
 
Cavendish here suggested that should women pursue experimental natural philosophy, 
then men could go on to apply their reason for other, more “important” sociocultural 
matters. Women, after all, have access to the sensory system just as much as men, and 
should they thus become a resource for scientific inquiry, men need no longer waste their 
time tinkering with “artificial means.” 
To clarify, Cavendish did not entirely disagree with Hooke—she believed the 
microscope to be a useful tool for providing previously unconsidered views of natural 
phenomena. Indeed, scientists should use tools like the microscope to observe what they 
could not otherwise see. They should not, however, treat artificial observations as the 
only infallible records of truth, or imply that the human senses are in need of “reparation” 
or “purification.” Therein lay Cavendish’s second major point of critique: the values 
experimental philosophers ascribed to new ways of seeing through the microscope, to the 
“pride of place” that came to be extended to empirical observation and that thus belittled 
other ways of knowing the surrounding world.7 Unlike Hooke, who offered readers of 
 
7 Literary scholar Tita Chico argues that Cavendish was in error when she 
pinpointed the weakness of the microscope. Cavendish was one who “implies that 
microscopes are a kind of plaything that have little to do with accurate perception,” 
according to Chico (2006, 151). But such inaccuracy would have enamored experimental 
philosophers, as it proved the “monstrosity of nature”—to use Daston and Galison’s 
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Micrographia a practicum on how to reason through the microscope, Cavendish would 
offer readers of her Observations ways to speculate around epistemic theories and 
understand the natural world by attuning to it.  
The Internal Substance of Natural Phenomena 
If historians wish to find Cavendish’s place in the history of ideas, they must 
consult her understanding of matter, which was more agential and vitalist than her 
counterparts, argues historian of science and philosophy Karen Detlefsen (Detlefsen 2018, 
75). Because she distanced herself from Hobbes and Hooke in regard to distinctions 
between art and nature and the status of knowledge more generally, she would have to 
theorize a new understanding of matter as well. Recall that Hooke and Hobbes conveyed 
nature as mechanical and passive, that which could be revealed by human, artificial 
means. To counter this definition and infuse a greater sense of agency in nature, 
Cavendish would first have to show the limits of their mechanistic materialism. Her final 
point of contention with Hooke’s Micrographia, then, was what exactly could come into 
view through the refractive lens of the microscope, what empirical philosophers could 
and could not view through the eyepiece.  
Hooke’s stance was that artificial means brought the internal substance of matter 
to view, or “the subtilty of the composition of Bodies, the structure of their parts, the 
various texture of their matter, the instruments and manner of their inward motions” to 
 
phrase (2010, 67). Perception was indeed the issue for Cavendish, but her disavowal of the 
microscope had less to do with the importance of the scientific tool as with who was 
given access to reason through its means, whose perception mattered. If microscopy came 
to be the only valued observation, then women’s observations through contemplative 
philosophy would come to be dismissed. 
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light (Hooke 1665, 21). By contrast, Cavendish was adamant that the microscope could 
only observe the external aspects of objects under study. Internal substance—or the 
unique patterns subsisting within an object, giving the object its vitality—was not 
something that could be assessed through microscopy. Hooke, and most other 
experimental philosophers, would not entertain this point, but on this idea Cavendish 
placed her only direct assurance in Observations. “Of this I am confident,” she stated, 
“that this same art, with all its instruments, is not able to discover the interior natural 
motions of any part or creature of nature” (Cavendish 1666b, 50, emphasis added). 
Motion, as we will see, was of vital importance for Cavendish’s optics and theory of 
matter—motion not passively imparted from another source, as was the case in Hobbes’s 
mechanistic materialism, but motion actively initiated from within matter itself. The 
microscope, by contrast, required that motion be stilled, a requirement that brings 
Frédérique Aït-Touati to call Hooke’s microscopic images “still lives,” as in still life 
paintings (Aït-Touati 2011, 150). Therefore, for Cavendish, if the internal substance of 
matter was vital, living, and moving, then observing a static slice of those objects could 
never fully convey that vitality.  
Sarasohn pinpoints the beginnings of this vital materialism in Cavendish’s 
Philosophical Letters (1664) through her contradictions of Hobbes’s mechanistic 
materialism (Sarasohn 2003, 41). Like Hobbes, Cavendish believed that matter was in 
constant in motion—the two thinkers diverged, however, when it came to “the extent to 
which matter and mankind may be described as free, either to move or to choose” 
(Sarasohn 2003, 41). In Hobbesian materialism, particles did not move in and of 
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themselves; physical causation was required for particles to hit one another (Sarasohn 
2003, 46). Cavendish’s materialism, on the other hand, assigned traits to matter usually 
associated with human agency: “it moves, it senses, it reasons, it is free” (Detlefsen 2007, 
188). This freedom, Sarasohn further explains, is extended because of matter’s self-moving 
tendencies (Sarasohn 2003, 48). Placing matter in self-moving motion not only extended 
radical agency to nature, but in doing so also extended greater agency and reputability to 
women in their “natural state.” Cavendish authored such theories for just that reason: 
“the actual world [she] lived in was not free and natural” (Sarasohn 2003, 53). Instead, her 
social world “resembled more closely Thomas Hobbes’s artificial state where motion, and 
freedom, is constrained” (Sarasohn 2003, 53). It was this vital materialism that allowed 
Cavendish to speculate around the mechanistic fate of women in early modern England 
and anticipate alternate epistemologies.  
Cavendish thus turned to contemplative philosophy as the best method for 
studying interiors, and the human eye—without interference from artificial means—was 
shown as the best method for studying exteriors. The human eye, for Cavendish, was 
more than just its faulty lens—it was a networked, holistic system inextricable from 
cognition. As she explained, “The best optic is a perfect natural eye, and a regular 
sensitive perception; and the best judge, is reason; and the best study, is rational 
contemplation joined with the observations of regular sense, but not deluding arts” 
(Cavendish 1666b, 53, emphasis added). With each additional artificial lens of the 
microscope, there was more opportunity for distortion. And those most susceptible to the 
danger of the microscope were those who were unaware of what was and was not 
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distorted, namely women and individuals of lower classes who lacked access to the 
education and empirical tools needed to test their hypotheses.  
To present a theory of sensation (and perception) that allowed those with artificial 
means to adequately peer into nature’s internal substance, Cavendish would create her 
own optics, an optics involving less visual distortion and privileging everyday ways of 
seeing. This optics would extend ancient theories of sight through a redefinition of 
mimesis in order to explain a radical agency that considered an inner life or vitality within 
every physical entity. It would maintain that seeing the physical structure of objects 
through a microscope did not equate to knowing their vitality. It would maintain that any 
human observer could witness the vitality of natural phenomena without artificial means. 
Finally, it would theorize a practice for seeing and languaging alongside natural 
phenomena—rather than reasoning about, outside, or around them—a practice 
Cavendish would come to call “patterning.”  
Patterned Optics and Sensory Mimesis  
To base experimental conclusions only on microscopic views risked ignoring the 
holistic body surrounding that material viewed in cross section. Indeed, the foundational 
idea underlying Cavendish’s optics was a certain notion that matter consisted of vital—
possibly agential—energy. A fundamental premise underlying her contention with 
Hooke’s optics was that the human was not the only active participant in scientific 
observation. Matter, too, that “stuff” that made up the building blocks of “objects,” was 
also moving, living, speaking. As this section details, matter became an actor in 
Cavendish’s scientific epistemology, an epistemology displaying an agential personhood 
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of sorts that attempted to expand agency beyond the mechanistic systems of Hobbes and 
Hooke. Cavendish’s optics, then, hoped for a way of seeing in which both observer and 
the object of study existed in a synoptical network of relations. Such synopsis derived not 
from a bird’s eye view or a “still life,” but instead from recognition that human visual 
perception was indebted to a multiplicity of acting agents. This expansive agency was part 
of the reason that mimesis—here the drama that unfolded in nature and the process that 
structured the “communicative” practices among and between agents in nature—played a 
central role in Cavendish’s optics. Not often does a theory of optics intersect with the 
history of rhetoric, but here a scientific epistemology is made possible because the 
rhetorical concept of mimesis could be molded to expand agency in early modern 
metaphysics.  
To theorize vision as viewing the vitality of matter and as a sensory process rooting 
human observers in their bodies, Cavendish defined sight as the “pattern[ing] out” of 
“perceptive motions in the optic sense” (Cavendish 1666b, 147). For Cavendish, “patterns” 
had to do with the ability of sense organs to create internal motions in the form of a 
pattern of a perceived external object (Cunning 2019, 18). What exactly was “patterned 
out” by the eye had to do with the vital internal substance of particular objects. 8 
According to Cavendish, every object was composed of a certain vital makeup, and that 
 
8 The idea of “patterning” may also evoke notions of quilt making. Much research 
has been written on quilting as a feminist embodied and communicative practice—see, 
for example, Elsley (1990), Fisk (2012), and Witkowski (2014). Most relative to this study is 
biologist Maura C. Flannery’s (2011) depiction of quilting as a feminist metaphor for how 
scientific inquiry may most ethically progress. 
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vitality manifested though “internal motions” performed as part of its being (there). 
Vision occured when an observer detected the internal pattern being performed by an 
object and relayed that patterned performance to the mind. This process of mimetic 
patterning ensured for Cavendish that every observer was indebted to the synoptic 
performance of their object of study, in contradistinction to Hooke’s optics that would 
place the human observer as viewing only a portion of the object in miniscule form. Not 
only did Cavendish resist the static specimen beneath the microscope, she further 
resisted a static observation, calling attention instead to the bodily, sensing work required 
of the observer. In this optics of patterning and ever-changing, ever-in-flux motion, 
seeing became more imitation than observation.  
From her earliest writings, the rhetorical concept of mimesis, or “imitation,” as she 
often called it, was central to how Cavendish conceived of sensation, especially visual 
perception. Yet, in keeping with the rhetorical tradition of her time, Cavendish learned 
the concept of mimesis in the context of rhetoric and poetics. That is, the primary use of 
“imitation” in The World’s Olio involved the traditional rhetorical notion of imitation as a 
“copy.” As she put it: “A good Imitation is good, and Those are to be commended that 
copy well an excellent original” (Cavendish 1655, Book II, Part i). “Yet,” Cavendish 
continued, clarifying that patterns are what individuals copy during imitation, “it 
expresseth want of Invention that They cannot draw without a Pattern.” Later in The 
World’s Olio, Cavendish spoke again of the differences between imitation and invention, 
in that instance mentioning “Rhetorick” specifically (Cavendish 1655, Book II, Part i). 
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Cavendish nevertheless employed the concept of “imitation” in a different valence 
elsewhere in the treatise to explain how the mind processes information from the senses: 
There is nothing in the understanding, that is not first in the senses. . . . The senses 
bring all the materials into the brain, and then the brain cuts and divides them, 
and gives them quite other forms, then the senses many times presented them. . . . 
When the brain works upon her own materials, and at home, it is called poetry 
and invention, but when the brain receives and words journey-work, which is not 
of its own materials, then it is called learning, and imitation. (Cavendish 1655, 
Book I, Part i) 
 
This passage shows the early stages of Cavendish’s theory of mimetic patterning, with the 
brain receiving and imitating materials “which [are] not its own.”  
Mimesis in ancient rhetoric most often references the use of a paradigm case that 
is imitated by a student.9 Of course, Cavendish was not the first to turn to mimesis for its 
malleability in describing the fluid demarcations between external phenomena and 
internal perception. Historians of rhetoric generally identify three meanings for mimesis: 
the Platonic notion of images as copies of ideal truth; the Aristotelian notion of poetics as 
representations of human action; and the pedagogical notion of copying, simulating, or 
emulating models (Corbett 1971, 243; Farrell 1986, 8-11; Haskins 2000). Eric Havelock 
admits, however, that mimesis may be “the most baffling of all words in [Plato’s] 
philosophic vocabulary,” given how the philosopher initially applied the term to drama 
but then “seems to enlarge [the term] to cover several other phenomena” (Havelock 1982, 
 
9 There is much evidence to suggest that Cavendish would have had a robust 
understanding of ancient rhetorical writers and thus conceptions of mimesis. In her 
analysis of Cavendish’s books, Crawford uncovers the expert knowledge Cavendish had of 
ancient Greek and Roman authors like Plutarch, Thucydides, and Livy, authors of whom 
Cavendish often denied having knowledge (Crawford 2018, 95). Crawford argues that 
Cavendish’s reticence in that regard signaled a certain political positioning. 
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20). Addressing the various iterations of the term in ancient rhetoric, John Muckelbauer 
articulates that mimesis captured “the dynamics through which [a] model is encountered 
in order to be imitated, in order to produce some kind of copy” (Muckelbaur 2003, 67). 
Beyond the reproduction or variation of a model, mimesis also addressed the idea of 
inspiration, of change evoked from the model (Muckelbaur 2003, 83-85). In describing the 
ancient rhetorical aspect of mimesis relating to inspiration, Muckelbauer captures the 
essence of Cavendish’s own expansion of the term. This aspect of mimesis introduced a 
complication to “the dialectical relation between subjects and their models” 
(Muckelbauer 2003, 83). As Muckelbauer explains, “the model here is not encountered as 
content at all. . . . Instead, in the act of inspiration, the model transmits only inspiration 
itself, it transmits the very capacity to be carried out of oneself” (Muckelbauer 2003, 85-
86). Muckelbauer finds this articulation of mimesis in how ancient writers spoke of the 
muses, but the idea of a transmission of inspiration, a transmission of sensory 
information rather than exact representation, is certainly echoed in Cavendish’s own use 
of the term. As her theory of sensory mimesis implied, human observers come to “know” 
non-human matter not through the literal copying of their patterns, but through 
imitation of them. 
In turning to mimesis, Cavendish not only harnessed the concept’s roots in ancient 
rhetoric but also participated in the Renaissance uses of the term that informed theories 
of personhood, including Hobbes’s “artificial man.” Such theories of personhood, explains 
historian Quentin Skinner, contended with how an individual could act in or bear the 
name of someone else, or, in Hobbes’s case, the commonwealth (1999, 6). And in the time 
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of Hobbes and Cavendish the idea of acting in the name of another was caught up with 
the “dramatis personae on the stage” (Skinner 1999, 6), which implied various layers of 
mimesis in personhood, i.e, where the “natural” ended and performance, or the “artificial” 
began. As Skinner shows, mimesis became central to Hobbes’s theory of man, as Hobbes 
wrote: “a Person, is the same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common 
Conversation” (1999, 6). In other words, all the world was a stage to Hobbes, and this idea 
circulated widely in his time (Skinner 1999, 12). Whether Cavendish’s adoption of mimesis 
to define sensation and agential matter derived from Hobbes is less important than 
knowing that the concept of performance was a powerful social idea that fell on 
interested ears during her time. Staging in the seventeenth century, drama scholar 
Rebecca D’Monte further explains, lent itself to theories of personhood and identity 
because performance was seen as a way to recreate the self (2003, 109). For Hobbes, 
mimesis allowed man to overcome his natural state. For Cavendish, mimesis offered a 
way to rethink early modern metaphysics. 
Cavendish’s reappropriation of the term for scientific use, presented mimesis, or—
in this case—mimetic patterning, as opponent to the recreation or reproduction of 
objects through mechanical means, and proponent to the rhetorical encounter in which 
the seer imitates, and thus more immediately responds to, objects in the natural world. 
To put it another way, Cavendish’s optics might have been based on mimesis, but did not 
presume that vision directly represented the outside world. Instead, to see was to perform 
an internal conception of the outside world. In defining vision as “patterns of motion,” 
seeing became less a process of acting on an object but acting with that object. 
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In Philosophical Fancies (1653), written just two years prior to The World’s Olio, 
Cavendish worked out her conception of how sensation was the process wherein the 
mind copied patterns from material objects. There, she described this unique “pattern” of 
vital movement within objects as dancers on a dance floor. Just as with the repetition of 
movements performed by dancers, she insisted, the pattern exuded by an object could be 
traced as if it were unfolding on a ballroom floor (Marshall 2016, xvii). In visual 
perception, the “rational spirits” of an observer witnessed the dance that is internal and 
unique to an object and then replicated, or imitated, that dance for the brain. By dancing 
the same dance, the mind comes to “know” the object. And an observer could never 
“know” the object only through observation, but through this mimetic patterning of the 
object. As the years progressed, Cavendish replaced the dance metaphor with the 
language of “patterns” or “imitations” to more explicitly describe the visual process 
(Marshall 2016, xvii).  
By the time of Observations, Cavendish relied upon “imitation” and patterning to 
explain the play of the senses, or how visual signals moved from the external world into 
the internal mind. Literary scholar Lisa Walters considers Cavendish’s concept of 
“patterning” as working counter-logically to ancient theories of vision in which force was 
necessary for sight (2014b, 377).10 In the Platonic extramission theory of vision—most 
 
10 Force is a contentious issue in theories of vision. The Royal Society’s optics of 
objectivity, in which the observer acts upon objects but is never acted upon, recalled 
Platonic theories of vision. This similarity has led feminist literary critics to connect 
thinkers from the Royal Society, such as Francis Bacon, with the concept of the “male 
gaze.” As Walters explains: “Though Bacon suggests that scientists have not been able to 
dominate Nature, she is none the less imagined as a female body to penetrate and violate 
by male reason for the pursuit of knowledge. The male/female binary is utilized to 
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notably presented in the Timaeus (Plato 2000)—the force of vision rested with the 
observer: beams were thought to exude from the observer’s eyes in order to reach out and 
“grab” the beams exuded from the object. In this process of reaching out to “grab” the 
object in order to perceive it, the observer altered the nature of the object. By contrast, 
Aristotle’s intromission theory of vision, as expounded in the De Anima (Aristotle 2016), 
contended that the observer was completely passive and that the force in vision rested 
with the external world. That is, beams from the object jumped into the eyes and mind of 
the observer. The only thing an observer could do to halt this process was to close their 
eyes.  
Cavendish’s theory of optics, however, struck a balance between the two: objects 
certainly exuded “patterns” (otherwise considered “beams”) and thus had agential force in 
portraying how they were perceived, but the observer also maintained agency in that she 
must consciously imitate this pattern in order to see or know the object. Vision, in this 
schema, was not merely about projecting or receiving a static representation of the world, 
but about dancing along with the world. Cavendish herself dispelled “transmission” 
optical theories in Observations, asserting instead her “opinion . . . that the most rare and 
subtlest parts in the animal sensitive organs, do pattern out the figures of exterior objects, 
and that the perception of the exterior animal senses, to wit, sight, hearing, tasting, 
touching, smelling, is certainly made by no other way, than by figuring and imitation” 
(Cavendish 1666b, 174-175, emphasis added). In short, sensation, and how the brain 
 
portray a relation between knowledge and sexual power. Power can be obtained over 
Nature as man has power over woman” (Walters 2014a, 63). 
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processes sensory information through perceptual processes, involved mimetic 
interaction with the natural world. Unlike ancient theories of vision or the Royal Society’s 
optics, which hinged upon artificial means to validate or provide factual “proof” for a now 
expert observer, Cavendish’s optics consisted of visual perception based on patterning or 
mimesis, on an embodied observer who was always entwined with or indebted to that 
which she observed.  
This use of mimesis to build an alternative theory of optics certainly involved a 
conception of agency that extended beyond the bounds of the human for Cavendish. 
During acts of vision or perception, the interplay between external and internal, agent 
and object shifted: 
When I say that the ‘exterior object is the agent; and the sentient body, the 
patient’: I do not mean, that the object does chiefly work upon the sentient, or is 
the immediate cause of the perception in the sentient body, and that the sentient 
suffers the agent to act upon it; . . . . I am quite of a contrary opinion, to wit, that 
the sentient body is the principal agent, and the external body the patient; for the 
motions of the sentient in the act of perception, do figure out or imitate the 
motions of the object, so that the object is but as a copy that is figured out, or 
imitated by the sentient, which is the chief agent in all transforming and 
perceptive actions that are made by way of patterning or imitation. (Cavendish 
1666b, 18, emphasis added) 
 
Placing both object and observer as acting agents in visual perception, Cavendish not only 
brought these agents together in close proximity, but she also used mimesis as the 
mechanism by which to understand sensory encounters, to understand the 
communicative exchange between human and nonhuman matter.11 And considering 
 
11 This communicative exchange, Cavendish made clear, does not occur in 
conscious, voluntary channels. As she put it, “The actions of imitation or patterning, are 
different from the voluntary actions” of other bodily functions like “expulsion” (Cavendish 
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Cavendish’s optics of mimetic patterning as a theory of rhetorical communication need 
not seem anachronistic, especially considering that Cavendish herself explained 
patterning as “the perpetual commerce and intercourse between parts and parts” 
(Cavendish 1666b, 140, emphasis added). Thus, we can understand Cavendish’s use of 
“imitation” and patterning as an expansion and redefinition of rhetorical mimesis for use 
in scientific epistemologies, explaining ways of relation between human and nonhuman 
matter. 
That Cavendish initially conceived of this optics of patterning and the process of 
visual perception as sensory mimesis through dance is telling. This metaphor of dance 
was one of multiple valences for Cavendish that became more enriched with each 
iteration of her optics, even once the language of dance, of explicit performance, fell away 
and only the language of “patterns” and “imitation” remained. At its core, the metaphor 
speaks to the insistence of partnerships in early modern English dances, partnerships in 
which each partner had assigned steps but the freedom to perform those steps as they 
desired. As Boyle explains: “While dances typically follow a certain pattern or set of rules, 
they are performed by intelligent creatures who may choose whether or not to follow the 
rules of the dance” (Boyle 2018, 68). With the interaction between humans and 
nonhuman matter during vision described as a dance, nonhuman matter is ascribed a 
degree of agency that counters the mechanistic metaphors of experimental philosophy in 
which nature is depicted as a machine or a clock (Boyle 2018, 68). 
 
1666b, 35). Patterning, instead, happens on a different register, often, she implied, 
unbeknownst to the conscious mind. 
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Cavendish’s optics, then, stood in stark contrast to other metaphysics and 
scientific epistemologies of her time by privileging a woman’s way of interacting with the 
world, a way of listening to and languaging alongside nonhuman matter. Hooke, of 
course, with his microscope, would go on pave the road for microbiology, a field 
necessary for the study of human diseases. Cavendish’s writings, admittedly, made no 
such changes to histories of science, but her aims were not based in the establishment of 
empirical facts as much as they were about how those facts were ascertained and who was 
given authority and access to establish them. And it is worth noting that only in the wake 
of feminist new materialisms, cognitive neuroscience, and the championing of alternative 
epistemologies have Cavendish’s ideas begun to sound especially prescient. Detlefsen has 
shown that Cavendish’s theories of nature presage at least “one contemporary feminist 
account within the philosophy of science, that offered by Evelyn Fox Keller” (Detlefsen 
2018, 73). Cavendish’s choice of the keyword “pattern” too is consistent with the work of 
contemporary neuroscientists like Howard Gardner, Margaret Livingstone, and Semir 
Zeki, all of whom study the visual brain. Gardner uses the language of “patterning” most 
explicitly when he discusses how knowledge is stored neurally (Gardner 1983, 152), and 
Zeki contends that the brain creates patterns from past visual experiences and then 
interprets present sensory stimuli according to those patterns (Zeki 1999, 5-6). Further 
still, Cavendish’s metaphor of the “pattern” animates and makes agential the building 
blocks of matter, theories legitimized by feminist new materialisms and the findings of 
quantum physics in the last several decades (Barad 2007; Bennett 2010). Now an 
important concept for contemporary sciences, Cavendish’s turn to “patterning” allowed 
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her to anticipate key premises in feminist science studies and envision the interaction 
between human and nonhuman matter in scientific encounters in both its conceptual 
and material valences through the rhetorical concept of mimesis. 
The Rhetorical Effect of Optics as Mimetic Patterning  
When Cavendish received the invitation to attend a Royal Society meeting in May 
1667, she exemplified the confidence that came from her mimetic epistemology, from the 
idea that objects seen as other, whether metaphorically or through the microscope, play 
active rhetorical roles. As was mentioned at the onset, most scholars have considered 
Cavendish’s natural philosophy too imaginative to be scientific and her visit to the Royal 
Society too timid to be a success. Now, with the additional evidence of Cavendish’s 
critique of the Royal Society, her overturning of early modern metaphysics, and her 
mimetic optics, we may return to a critically imaginative reading of that visit, one that 
allows us to consider the possibility that Cavendish recognized the mimetic dynamic at 
play that day. In such a critically imaginative reading, it becomes less important whether 
Cavendish was rhetorically persuasive and more important that we observe how she 
turned to the rhetorical concept of mimesis for confidence in confronting the optics of 
the Royal Society. 
That is, knowing that members of the Royal Society were to place her “under the 
microscope,” perhaps Cavendish presented herself before the experimental philosophers 
as an object worthy of study and performed in such a way as to resist their being able to 
know or understand her. Members of the Royal Society would study her like their 
specimens: as a static object upon which to gaze, not as a living subject from which to 
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learn. Literary scholar Kate Lilley once touted Cavendish as “an exemplary instance of 
woman as spectacle” (Lilley 1992, ix). This role of spectacle, best captured through her 
nickname, “Mad Madge,” was “dependent on the exhibition of herself for the benefit of an 
audience,” argues D’Monte (2003, 120). Instead of trying to persuade Society members 
that she was a reputable natural philosopher—an impossibility in their estimation—
Cavendish leaned into the role of “Mad Madge” because this position of other, she knew, 
would demand attention, if not a response.  
But it would also not be too bold to suggest that Cavendish exposed the limits of 
the Royal Society’s optics: if an object is studied only beneath a microscope, 
metaphorically or otherwise, there is no way to conclude its substance. Had Cavendish 
spoken her mind that day, she likely would have slipped from being an object of study to 
an object of ridicule. Through her performance of silence, she placed herself at a distance, 
performing the role of object-under-study-by-experimental-philosophy. Even in her 
theories of rhetoric, Cavendish understood that the body often speaks louder than words: 
“It is true that there are more errors committed in speaking [than] in silence. . . . There is 
an old saying, to talk much and well is seldom heard” (Cavendish 1655, Book I, Part i 52). 
And whereas Cavendish’s theories may only recently be finding scholarly and scientific 
resonances, her performance did, indeed, command attention. Weeks later, Royal Society 
members were still talking about Cavendish’s presence at Arundel-house. In the early 
weeks of June 1667, the Council proposed that gifts be extended to those who “had taken 
pains in fitting the room for the late entertainment of the Duchess of Newcastle” (Royal 
Society 1667). Given the widespread attention garnered by her visit, it is not too much a 
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stretch of the imagination to suspect that this visit and Cavendish’s frequent publishing 
on experimental philosophy inflected with contemplative, embodied ways of knowing 
had ripple effects that allowed women to participate more frequently and confidently in 
scientific conversations. After all, as Chelsea Redeker Milbourne and Sarah Hallenbeck 
show, later iterations of the microscope, such as the pocket microscope of the eighteenth-
century, would allow women to become discoverers of nature and participants in a 
science that was more “accessible, personal, and embodied” (Milbourne and Hallenbeck 
2013, 412). Cavendish, it seems, anticipated, if not foreshadowed, feminist overturnings of 
hegemonic scientific epistemologies. 
The objective observer emerging around Hooke’s microscope in early modern 
England excluded women from scientific ways of knowing in that it “placed less 
importance on the embodied performances of the users and their personal reflections or 
opinions about the scientific process” (Milbourne and Hallenbeck 2013, 418).12 Cavendish 
presents an instance of one who subverted that scientific tradition as it emerged, an 
instance of a woman who invited other women to theorize alternative methods for 
scientific discovery through her own remaking of agency and materialism. She offers an 
early rhetorics of science in which alternative epistemologies—here, embodied and 
intuitive ways of knowing—might critique mechanical, experimental processes. Perhaps 
more pointedly, Cavendish’s optics, and the redefinition of rhetorical mimesis that 
 
12 See Daston and Galison (2010) for an overview of the debate about the origins of 
objectivity and the role played by Royal Society members in determining the evolution of 
visual practices in scientific argumentation. 
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enlivened it, offers a historical moment in which rhetoric offered tools for scientists to 
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